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Double Inequity? The Social Dimensions of Deforestation and Forest 
Protection in Local Communities in Northern Cambodia
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In Cambodia, numerous powerful drivers of land-use change threaten the remaining natural for-
est and the livelihoods of local communities living on the forest periphery. In an attempt to protect 
remaining forests, Community Forestry (CF) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) were implemented in the north-western province of Oddar Meanchey. This 
case study examines the distribution of costs and benefi ts within local communities participating in 
the CF/REDD+ project. Qualitative interviews conducted in the communities indicate how the costs 
of deforestation disproportionately aff ect the poorest households, which are more reliant on forest 
products due to less land and more insecure tenure. Meanwhile, the benefi ts from CF/REDD+ hardly 
reach these vulnerable households since their access to forest resources is constrained by physical 
barriers and a lack of resources or information. Their ability to enjoy benefi ts from forest protection 
is likewise limited by social exclusion facilitated by prevailing power structures. Instead, benefi ts are 
biased towards the better-off  households who engage in forest protection activities and decision-
making. In the context of weak governance, contested tenure arrangements, high agricultural de-
pendency, and power discrepancies, this paper analyzes and critically discusses this ‘double inequity’ 
of deforestation and forest protection in Cambodia, and recommendations on how to ensure more 
equitable distribution of costs and benefi ts are put forward. 
Keywords: Cambodia; Community Forestry; Deforestation; Equity; Social Assessment
Zahlreiche Triebkräfte von Landnutzungsveränderungen gefährden in Kambodscha sowohl die ver-
bleibenden Regenwälder als auch die Lebensgrundlagen von lokalen Gemeinschaften, die am Rand 
der Waldgebiete leben. Um die verbleibenden Wälder zu schützen, wurden in der nordwestlichen 
Provinz Oddar Meanchey Community Forestry (CF) und Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+) implementiert. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Verteilung von 
Kosten und Nutzen innerhalb von lokalen Gemeinschaften, die am CF/REDD+ Projekt beteiligt sind. 
Qualitative Interviews, die in den Dörfern durchgeführt wurden, zeigen, wie die Kosten der Abhol-
zung die ärmsten Haushalte, die aufgrund von weniger Land und unsichereren Besitzverhältnissen 
1   Maya Pasgaard is a PhD scholar at the Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. Her 
research focus involves the local impacts of REDD+ from a socio-political perspective. Contact: mase@ifro.ku.dk. 
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abhängiger von Forstprodukten sind, unverhältnismäßig stark treffen. Indes bewegt sich der Nutzen 
von CF/REDD+ weg von diesen benachteiligten Haushalten, weil ihr Zugang zu Waldressourcen durch 
physische Barrieren und einen Mangel an Ressourcen oder Informationen eingeschränkt ist. Ihre 
Möglichkeiten, mehr Vorteile aus dem Waldschutz zu ziehen, werden zudem durch soziale Exklusion, 
die durch vorherrschende Machtstrukturen bedingt wird, begrenzt. Stattdessen profitieren besserge-
stellte Haushalte stärker, indem sie sich an Maßnahmen zum Schutz des Waldes und an der Entschei-
dungsfindung beteiligen. Im Kontext von schwacher Governance, umkämpften Besitzverhältnissen, 
hoher Abhängigkeit von der Landwirtschaft und Machtdiskrepanzen analysiert und diskutiert dieser 
Artikel die „doppelte Ungerechtigkeit“ von Abholzung und Waldschutz in Kambodscha und bringt 
Vorschläge für eine gerechtere Verteilung von Kosten und Nutzen vor.
Schlagworte: Abholzung; Community Forestry; Fairness; Kambodscha; soziale Bewertungskriterien 
Introduction
In many South-East Asian countries, rapid and extensive deforestation and other 
massive land-use change have not only impacted both nature and ecological ser-
vices, but also local livelihoods. Cambodia is perhaps the most extreme case due 
to the compression of many sources of change in a short period of time and a rela-
tively small space (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011). These trends have concerned researchers 
(e.g. Le Billon, 2002; Poffenberger, 2009) as well as development agencies and donors 
in the past decades (e.g. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Danida] & Department 
for International Development [DFID], 2006; Thul, 2011). At the local, regional, and 
national scale, various drivers such as agricultural expansion by local communities 
and Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) by private companies led to deforestation in 
Cambodia (Poffenberger, 2009) – particularly in the north-western province of Oddar 
Meanchey (Bradley, 2009). In an attempt to protect remaining forests, the Cambo-
dian government and international donors initiated a national Community Forestry 
(CF) program, with projects emerging from this program in the early 2000s (The 
Center for People and Forests [RECOFTC], 2011), following the trend of many other 
South-East Asian countries and regions across the world. More recently, projects 
under the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD and 
REDD+) program have also emerged, with Cambodia’s first project established in Od-
dar Meanchey (United Nations REDD programme [UN-REDD], 2010). 
Despite the growing number of critical studies on REDD+ (e.g. Hansen, Lund, & 
Treue, 2009; Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011), international organizations plan and 
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implement these projects together with government agencies at a fast pace and 
extensive scale across continents (Cerbu, Swallow, & Thompson, 2011). Social co-
benefits and local livelihoods are high on the agenda; yet, social assessments of the 
feasibility and implications in the participant communities are lagging behind (Jag-
ger, Sills, Lawlor, & Sunderlin, 2010). The proposed social assessment approaches 
rely heavily on quantitative measures, while aiming at capturing the complexities of 
REDD+, such as intangible issues of participation and diverging interests of various 
stakeholders (e.g. Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011). Thus, there seems to be a gap or 
mismatch between the realities of REDD+ and the proposed social assessments rely-
ing on indicators, which preferably are tangible, measurable, and observable (Pas-
gaard, 2013). For instance, while equity is one of the main challenges in REDD+ (e.g. 
Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010), few indicators describe intra-community po-
litical impacts, which could help to assess equitability in the distribution of costs and 
benefits. Indeed, intra-community indicators describing existing or changing power 
relations among groups or individuals in a community are needed to assess people’s 
rights to access and use resources, e.g. to reveal if restrictions of use disproportion-
ately affect poorer people (Schreckenberg et al., 2010). Drawing on empirical data 
from Oddar Meanchey, this paper aims to address this specific gap in social assess-
ments by investigating how the costs and benefits from forest protection under CF/
REDD+ are distributed within communities. First, the paper provides the background 
for the study followed by a presentation of the REDD+ initiative. Second, the theoreti-
cal foundation is presented, followed by the methodology of the case study. Subse-
quently, the paper presents and discusses the results of the case study from a distri-
butional equity perspective and concludes by suggesting specific recommendations 
to ensure increased equity in REDD+.
Background
The Case Study Site
Throughout South-East Asia, REDD+ initiatives are emerging in a context of high de-
forestation rates and rapid land-use change. In an attempt to protect the remaining 
forests in Cambodia, the government, working together with donors, began to es-
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tablish a national CF program, which was officially recognized as a national policy in 
2003 (RECOFTC, 2011). In the north-western province of Oddar Meanchey (see Figure 
1), which has suffered from a deforestation rate of more than 2 percent decline in 
forest cover per year (Bradley, 2009), 13 CFs have been established and are managed 
by local communities. These CFs provide the platform for the country’s first REDD+ 
demonstration project initiated in 2008, followed by the approval of the National 
UN-REDD Program a few years later (UN-REDD, 2010). The REDD+ project in Oddar 
Meanchey CFs is expected to provide financing and development to the communi-
ties through carbon credits generated from the forest protection and regeneration 
(Terra Global, 2012). The 13 CFs in Oddar Meanchey participating in the REDD+ dem-
onstration project consist of 58 villages and cover an area of approximately 68,000 
hectares of forestland (see Table 1). An international NGO (Pact) and two local NGOs 
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
Figure 1: The Oddar Meanchey Province bordering Thailand which includes REDD+ project sites.
Source: Kmusser (2010)
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(Children’s Development Association and Monks’ Community Forestry) facilitate the 
preparation and implementation of the CF/REDD+ project in partnership with the 
government (the Forestry Administration). In the CFs, the Management Committees 
have the main responsibilities and decision-making power, including recruitment and 
fund management, and these committees are elected by CF members on five-year 
terms (Royal Government of Cambodia [RGC], 2003). In order to reach the targeted 
emission reductions, the REDD+ project aims to mitigate the local drivers of defores-
tation, including the conversion of forestland to agriculture by the increasing num-
ber of residents who rely on cropland (Blackburn, 2011). Specific project activities 
that aim to reduce deforestation in the project area include the reinforcement of 
forest land-tenure and formulation of land-use plans as well as a range of site-based 
activities, such as community-based forest protection, introduction of fuel-efficient 
stoves, agricultural intensification, and development of non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs) (Terra Global, 2012). According to the Forest Administration, a minimum of 50 
percent of net income from the sale of carbon credits, after project costs are covered, 
is expected to flow directly to local communities (Bradley, 2009). Both monetary and 
non-monetary benefits from the protection of the forest (e.g. in terms of NTFPs) 
are to be shared among the community members. One of the main policy docu-
Table 1: The 13 Community Forestry groups in Oddar Meanchey, the number of villages and 
people involved, membership rates and size of the CF.  (* sites included in the study)
Source: Pact 2012
Angdong Bor
Chhouk Meas*
Dung Beng
Ou Yeay Kaov
Phaav
Prey Srorng*
Prey Srors
Ratanak Ruka
Rolus Thom 
Romdoul Veasna
Samaky*
Sangkrous Preychheu*  
Sorng Rokavorn*
Total
99
42
100
74
100
71
97
79
46
100
44
62
100
81
6,114
383
1,843
960
2,025
6,344
1,604
12,872
2,666
6,016
1,079
4,151
18,261
64,318
3,267
641
1,611
577
1,383
3,058
1,371
16,214
4,123
4,252
2,669
2,179
3,551
44,896
4
1
4
1
4
5
2
16
4
4
4
3
6
58
VILLAGESCOMMUNITY FORESTS POPULATION CF MEMBERS (%) CF SIZE (HA)
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ments calls for a pro-poor approach to benefit sharing to specifically ensure that the 
poorest households receive substantial benefits from the project (Terra Global, 2012). 
Drawing on empirical findings from Oddar Meanchey, the question of how costs and 
benefits from CF/REDD+ are shared within communities on the ground is addressed 
in this paper. First, some background on deforestation and migration in the province 
is provided, as the direct drivers of and the patterns inscribed in pressures on land 
and forest resources play an important role in the analysis of distributional equity 
within communities. 
Deforestation and Migration Pressures in Oddar Meanchey 
Complex factors at the local, national, and regional level drive deforestation in Cambodia 
– and in the Oddar Meanchey province in particular (Table 2). At the local level, agricul-
tural expansion, forestland encroachment, and illegal logging as well as land speculation 
and firewood consumption lead to deforestation (Bradley, 2009; Strange, Theilade, Thea, 
Sloth, & Helles, 2007). At the national and regional level, large-scale Economic Land Con-
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
Table 2: Drivers and Agents of Deforestation in Oddar Meanchey. 
Source: Adapted from Terra Global (2012).
Forest clearing  
for land sales
Conversion to cropland
Conversion to settlements
Fuel wood gathering
Forest fires induced to 
clear forest understory
Forest fires induced  
by hunters
Illegal logging for 
commercial on-sale
Timber harvesting for 
domestic use
Large economic land 
concessions
Timber concessions
X 
X
X
X
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cessions (ELCs) as well as influential elites and the military drive deforestation through 
the encroachment on forests and crop land (Poffenberger, 2009). These actors are often 
reported to be involved in illegal logging of valuable timber (e.g. Sidon, 2011). 
Behind these direct drivers are underlying causes contributing to deforestation such as 
poverty and population growth, pushing migrants to clear land and settle in the forest-
rich remote provinces like Oddar Meanchey (UN-REDD, 2010). Weak forest sector gover-
nance, external commercial interests, ELCs granted by the government, and displace-
ment of rural populations aggravate the problem (UN-REDD, 2010) with high levels of 
corruption and violence in the forestry sector also playing a role (Global Witness, 2007). 
Furthermore, the influx of poor, landless people to Oddar Meanchey and other forest-
rich resource frontiers plays an important role in the competition for land and resources 
(United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2004). Indeed, communi-
ties in the area are relatively young. A household survey conducted in the province shows 
that on average, people migrated to their present villages in 1999 with a steady rise of 
migration until the mid-2000s, when the migration rate leveled off (Blackburn, 2011). In 
a migration study, McMahon (2008) notes how community leaders in Oddar Meanchey 
around the turn of the century freely allowed newcomers to join and clear necessary 
land with available labor as the only apparent limitation. Recent years of violent upsurge 
and unrest at the Thai-Cambodian border has brought military families to the province, 
adding a further dimension to the migration pressure. For instance, more than 740 mi-
grant families have moved into one of the CF areas over the past two years, claiming land 
for settlement and cultivation in local communities, while forestry officials have been 
unable to control their widespread clearance of forest (Bradley, 2012). 
Underlying these deforestation and migration pressures are insecure and contest-
ed land tenure arrangements in Cambodia (So, 2010). Land tenure security and rights 
to carbon are central themes in REDD+ and essential to the discussion of benefit dis-
tribution (e.g. Sikor et al., 2010; Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010). Yeang (2012) 
analyzes tenure and REDD+ in Oddar Meanchey, arguing that in addition to securing 
tenure rights over land and forest resources of local communities in the project, 
tenure arrangements need to be continuously enforced in order to avoid overlapping 
claims. It is important to distinguish between forest tenure, which is strengthened 
under CF and REDD+ (Yeang, 2012), and agricultural tenure arrangements in the par-
ticipating communities (Biddulph, 2011). While the rights to the forest, trees, and car-
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bon are directly related to the implementation and success of REDD+, land rights and 
patterns for settlement and farming affect deforestation and benefit sharing in a less 
direct way. Based on research in Oddar Meanchey, Biddulph (2011) for instance ar-
gues that people with insecure access to agricultural land present a greater threat to 
the forests than people with secure access, as the latter have less incentive to clear 
patches of forest for land use. From this perspective, agricultural tenure is strongly 
linked to deforestation and in turn the success of CF/REDD+. The role of agricultural 
tenure for the distribution of costs and benefits within communities participating in 
CF/REDD+ in Oddar Meanchey are further discussed in this paper.
Equity in REDD+
McDermott and colleagues (2013) provide a comprehensive conceptual framework 
that identifies and brings together three dimensions of equity in REDD+, namely 
distributional, procedural, and contextual equity. Distributional equity is a major 
concern and widely discussed in the REDD+ literature, e.g. in terms of which actors 
should have the right to benefit from the program (Angelsen, Brockhaus, Sunderlin, 
& Verchot, 2012; van Noordwijk, Purnomo, Peskett, & Setion, 2008). Procedural eq-
uity relates to representation, participation, inclusion, and recognition in decision-
making processes, while contextual equity concerns the underlying political process-
es and the social context; the latter issues are often overlooked and underplayed in 
the design of interventions such as REDD+ (Hansen, Lund, & Treue 2009; McDermott, 
Mahanty, & Schreckenberg, 2013).
At the center of investigation, distributional equity provides the main theoreti-
cal anchoring in this paper for the assessment of how costs and benefits are shared 
within communities. In this context, the intra-community level represents the spe-
cific target and social scale of the study (McDermott et al., 2013), namely the individu-
al and household level. The three dimensions of equity are not separate elements but 
highly interrelated and interdependent, and issues concerning procedural injustice 
and contextual dimensions are continuously present and affect distributional equity. 
In particular, social exclusion, constrains to access, and existing power structures 
are recurrent issues in REDD+ that can compromise distributional equity. Additional 
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
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insights in these matters are therefore provided in the following. 
Threats to an Equitable Distribution of Benefits
The risk of social exclusion from forest benefits has been studied and documented in 
various forest conservation projects, indicating problems with elite capture and exclu-
sion of certain groups (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Dahal, Larson, & Pacheco, 2010). 
Studies on community forestry groups in Nepal, which are at a more advanced stage 
than in Cambodia, point to the exclusion of certain disadvantaged user groups as a 
serious equity concern. Studies describe how poorer households benefit significantly 
less than wealthier households, as the poorer face more restricted access and are of-
ten excluded from the forest management decision-making body (Adhikari, Di Falco, & 
Lovett, 2004). Decision-making bodies are often dominated by wealthier groups who 
have greater levels of awareness, while poorer groups have limited information and 
greater time constraints (Malla, Neupane, & Branney, 2003). For instance, decisions by 
resource-rich groups also concern the principles applied for the distribution of benefits, 
e.g. whether benefits should be allocated in proportion to contribution (merit-based), 
in accordance with needs, or based on other criteria (McDermott et al., 2013). Such 
principles are central to distributional equity, in particular in contexts of procedural in-
equity, where disadvantaged groups are excluded from participation or decision-mak-
ing or are less able to contribute to forest protection activities (Agarwal, 2001).
Paying special attention to the social context and structures within communi-
ties is likewise essential in order to understand how costs and benefits are shared. 
Patron-client systems are informal social structures, which can affect distributional 
equity. These structures are highly relevant in a Cambodian socio-political context 
and can play an important role in community-based forest protection programs such 
as CF/REDD+. Scott (1972) defines a patron-client relationship as a largely instrumen-
tal friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses 
his or her influence and resources to provide protection or benefits for a person of 
lower status (client) who reciprocates by offering general support and assistance to 
the patron. Cambodian socio-political life is replete with such patronage networks 
involving exchange of resources and benefits between individuals (Hinton, 2005). 
Complex, interrelated networks of clients and powerful patrons are clearly prevalent 
ASEAS 6(2)
339338
in the forestry sector (Global Witness, 2007; Le Billon, 2000, 2002). Since strong formal 
institutions are often absent or incomplete in this context, such informal institutions 
can emerge with socially shared rules that converge or diverge from formal rules 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Historically, patron-client structures have flourished in 
both colonial and post-colonial times, with brutal consequences in Cambodia during 
the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s (Hinton, 2005). New external resources 
for patronage such as development programs have also been created, in which jobs, 
cash, and favors can flow down the network, and votes and support can flow up-
ward (Ledgerwood, 1998; Scott, 1972). Such changes in the external environment may 
change the distribution of power and resources within a community, strengthening 
actors who benefit from a particular informal setup while weakening others (Helmke 
& Levitsky, 2004). In other words, patronage practices seem to co-evolve with the de-
velopment of the country (e.g. Hughes, 2001; Ledgerwood, 1998, 2012). CF and REDD+ 
projects fall into this category of developments introducing decentralized control of 
physical and virtual forest benefits. With an electoral system, the leaders and com-
mittees are appointed by the members (RGC, 2003), providing the potential clients 
(CF members) with a new resource, namely the power to re-elect and support the 
appointed patron (CF leader). In return, the leader can use his or her discretionary 
power to control the access to forest resources, for instance, by distributing benefits 
suc has employment (appointing selected patrol teams) and permits (to extract re-
sources) (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [MAFF], 2006). 
Methodology
The findings presented in this paper are mainly based on a case study conducted in 
Oddar Meanchey in 2011. Data primarily consist of semi-structured interviews with 
local villagers in five CF sites (eight villages in total, see Table 3). 
The main interview questions revolved around respondents’ crop land and land titles, 
their use of the forest and engagement in CF and REDD+ activities as well as their 
views on deforestation and their future plans for agricultural expansion. In total, 114 
qualitative interviews were conducted (see Table 4 summarizing the main results). 
Interviews were conducted in Khmer (native language of one of the authors) and 
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
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ranged from 15 minutes to over 60 minutes. The selection of respondents was ran-
dom and covered about 10 percent of the village residents. Being an explorative study 
and one of the first of its kind to qualitatively assess local impacts from CF/REDD+ in 
the province, a relatively open and flexible interview approach was chosen. This al-
lowed for many follow-up questions based on the respondents’ answers, which often 
led the interview in unpredictable directions revealing useful information related to 
the three dimensions of equity. Relevant site-specific field observations were also an 
essential part of the data collection and subsequent analysis. For instance, wealth 
status was assessed and assigned for each respondent using a combination of infor-
Table 3: Description of the CFs and Villages Included in the Study 
COMMUNITY FOREST 
Chhouk Meas
Prey Srorng
Samaky
Sangkrous Preychheu
Sorng Rokavorn
BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
Established in August 2004 as a response to 
increasing levels of deforestation. The CF covers 
166 families.
Established in 2004 and covers 666 families. The 
forest is rich in timber resources and abundant 
wildlife, but was logged by a Thai company and 
influential elites between 1999 and 2003, and 
locals have cleared the forest land for farming.
Established in 2004 and covers 686 families. His-
torically, this CF was rich in high quality timber 
and abundant wildlife, but has been logged by 
locals and influential elites, and cleared to pro-
vide agricultural land. 
Initiated in 2001 and covers 633 families. The 
forest holds important mammal and bird spe-
cies and a Resin Enterprise Group was initiated 
in early 2010.
Initiated in 2001 by the local monk, venerable 
Bun Saluth, who took the lead in setting up a 
“Monk’s forest”, which evolved into community 
forestry. Covers 982 families. One of the larg-
est CFs, with many bird species and mammals, 
including endangered species. 
VILLAGES INCLUDED 
IN STUDY
Chouk Meas
Korki Kandal
Sralau Srorng
Ou Sramor
Ou Anrae
Day Thmey
Tom Nub Thmey
Poum Thmey
Source:  Pact (2011) Community Forestry profiles 
* CF area based on CF Agreement
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mation gained from the individual interviews (e.g. amount of land, type of land title, 
and income sources) and field observations (e.g. type and location of settlement, 
clothes, and jewellery). Besides wealth, respondents were categorized according to 
their settlement location and entitlement to farm land, and their position and en-
gagement in the CF. In-depth interviews and meetings with other stakeholders (gov-
ernment authorities, NGOs, and donors) were also conducted, and various secondary 
data sources were exploited. 
Deforestation, Forest Protection, and Equity 
As outlined above, the extensive and rapid land-use changes and deforestation in the 
Oddar Meanchey province and throughout Cambodia show significant implications 
at the local community level. Similarly, forest protection initiatives such as CF/REDD+ 
lead to changes in the participating communities. Empirical findings from the case 
study in Oddar Meanchey suggest that both deforestation and forest protection af-
fect equity in its various dimensions. Two aspects here are of particular relevance: 
First, to what extent deforestation and migration patterns coupled with contested 
tenure arrangements affect the poorest in the local communities; and second, to 
what extent are forest benefits from CF/REDD+ biased away from the poorest house-
holds, facilitated by a complicated web of constraints and social structures. 
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
Table 4: The main socioeconomic data from case study conducted 
in CF/REDD+ communities in Oddar Meanchey province 2011.
Source: UNHCR, 2000, p. 98.
*land title recognized by village chief, district authorities and/or the commune council
114 
(across 5 CFs 
and 8 villages)
Poor 29%
Medium 45%
Rich 27% 
3.6 ha 
(29% with 
land title*)
54%
(13% 
involved 
in forest 
patrols)
68% 25%44.350% f 
50% m
GENDERNUMBER OF 
RESPONDENTS
AVERAGE 
AGE
WEALTH 
ASSESSMENT
FARM LAND 
(AVERAGE)
CF MEMBERS DESIRE MORE 
LAND
EXPERIENCED 
EVICTIONS 
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Figure 2: Local perceptions on deforestation represented as percentage of respondents 
who mentioned specific drivers (grey) and agents (black) of deforestation in their area of resi-
dence. While many mentioned agriculture and timber collection as drivers, specific deforesta-
tion agents were pointed out in terms of military, high ranking people and “company” (refer-
ring acquisition of land by external business companies for plantations or mining). These local 
perceptions highlight not only the diverse and powerful pressures on the land and forests, but 
also indicate clear knowledge in the communities about the agents of deforestation, including 
their own critical role in forest clearings for agricultural purposes.
Source: Data collected by the authors
Agricultural 
Expansion
Timber/Wood 
Collection
High Ranking 
People
Military Company 
(Land 
Concession)
70%
33%
16%
10% 10%
 
The Costs of Deforestation and Migration Among the Poorest 
In Oddar Meanchey, findings show how the local perceptions on deforestation pre-
sented in Figure 2 confirm the drivers outlined in Table 1. 
According to many respondents in the case study, village chiefs, local and district au-
thorities as well as ‘people with guns’ are involved in capturing the benefits of natural 
resources. In one of the villages visited during the case study, several respondents re-
ported how the village chief threatened them to sell their land to him at a low price, 
after which he would sell it to a company with substantial economic surplus. Such 
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examples of land grabbing4 and evictions, some involving threats, violence, and under-
compensation, seem to be common in the province (Mengleng, 2011). Among the re-
spondents, fewer than one in three had a land title5 formally recognized by authorities 
while one in four of the respondents was somehow affected by land grabbing. Typically, 
their previous agricultural land or settlement had been taken over by outsiders such as 
plantation companies or the military, forcing them to migrate; or some or all of their 
present land was demarcated for take-over. In Oddar Meanchey, the real or perceived 
threat of land grabbing led villagers in some of the visited sites to clear the forest land 
for agriculture in order to ‘claim’ it, thereby intensifying deforestation (Nathan & Boon, 
2012). However, even if local or district authorities recognize a land title and communi-
ties have crops on the field, concession companies frequently take over the land, maybe 
with a small compensation or with the promise to hire workers from the villages. 
From an intra-community equity perspective, the findings from the case study in-
dicate that land grabbing and companies’ demarcation of villagers’ land disproportion-
ately affect the poorest households. Poorer households are more vulnerable and less 
resilient in a variety of ways. First, the empirical data and interviews suggest that bet-
ter-off groups of respondents have more diverse and stable livelihood options in terms 
of larger land and more secure tenure as well as other sources of income. In contrast, 
the poorer respondents have no or less land, often without formal titles, and they rely 
more on forest resources such as non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and wood for 
charcoal production – resources which are in decline due to the rapid deforestation and 
land-use changes. Even with the extensive and on-going land grabbing in the area, the 
interviews revealed that the vast majority of respondents planned to expand their cur-
rent agricultural land; however, these plans or desires were often constrained by lack 
of resources or available land. The opportunities to fulfill this desire diminish with the 
expansion of ELCs and the increased protection of forestland, which comes at a greater 
prize to the poor and landless that are short of other means to sustain their livelihoods. 
Secondly, the migration and settlement dynamics in the communities also disad-
vantage the poor. As noted earlier, villages and communities visited during the case 
4   In this paper, land grabbing refers to large-scale land acquisitions on villagers’ crop land, either legally granted 
by the government or through illegal, forced encroachment (for further discussions on land grabbing, see Anseeuw, 
Alden Wily, Cotula, & Taylor, 2012, p. 11, or De Schutter, 2011, who refers to land grabbing as the “acquisition or long-
term lease of large areas of land by investors” (p.249)).
5   A formal land title is signed by the village chief and with stamps from the district authorities and/or the commune 
council, the latter considered more ‘secure’ than the signature only. 
Maya Pasgaard & Lily Chea - Double Inequity?
ASEAS 6(2)
345344
study were relatively young. On average, the respondents had moved to their respec-
tive villages about 10 years ago. The influx of people has historically been driven by 
relocations related to the actions, downfall, and aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime 
(1975-1979, followed by unrest and civil war until the 1990s). More recently, the per-
ceived opportunities for getting agricultural land in Oddar Meanchey have attracted 
the poor and landless from both adjacent provinces and the lower Mekong area. Ac-
cording to some of the older settlers interviewed, the first people who migrated to 
the villages could clear the forest for agriculture “based on their abilities” (personal 
communication, July 6, 2011). Today, the case study findings suggest that new migrants 
have to buy land from other villagers because there is no more free land available. In-
terviews and observations in Oddar Meanchey indicate that early migrants settled by 
(or formed) the main road, while recent migrants settle off the main road at smaller 
< Nearest Forest Nearest District Town >
Crop Fields
Crop Fields
Crop Fields
Figure 3. Typical village structure. Sketch map of a fictive village in a community participat-
ing in the CF/REDD project in Oddar Meanchey. Larger settlements with houses with a concrete 
base and red metallic roofs are often situated along the main road with their crop fields ex-
tending outward from the back of the house. These houses dominantly belong to the early mi-
grants. The more recent migrants often settle at a distance to the main road in smaller wooden 
houses along the small dust roads with little or less land for agriculture.
Source: Authors
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dirt roads (Figure 3). What is crucial to this settlement pattern is that land concessions 
are often planned and realized at a certain distance away from the main road. Conse-
quently, the settlements and agricultural land of the poor located at a distance to the 
main road face a higher risk of land grabbing than the land near the main road belong-
ing to the wealthier group.
With the presence of companies and the threat of losing land, poor villagers are then 
pushed to seek other means of survival. Without alternative sources of subsistence 
there appears to be no local safety net to alleviate the negative social consequences 
for the poorest groups. Several respondents stated in the interviews that they were 
depressed and left with no options but to work for hire or (illegally) migrate to neigh-
boring countries to work at plantations under harsh conditions (Barney, 2009). In sum, 
the costs of deforestation and migration disproportionately affect the poorest groups. 
How benefits from the forest protection are allocated within communities is detailed 
below.
Benefits From Forest Protection: Constraints and Deliberate Exclusion 
In the CF/REDD+ villages studied in Oddar Meanchey, the most vulnerable groups appear 
to be excluded from the benefits of CF (Bradley, 2012). Several constraints can hinder 
villagers from participating and enjoying the benefits of forest protection and thereby 
lead to distributional inequity. By analyzing recurring themes in the interviews, four 
types of constraints became apparent: disabilities such as physical health (e.g. amputee 
or old age), resources such as money to buy petrol for patrolling or time to engage in CF 
activities, distance to the forest such as when limited resources (e.g. mushrooms) are 
captured by the villagers residing closer to the resource, and information such as being 
present during recruitment and having access to knowledge about activities. For in-
stance, a village deputy stated that his CF now covers more than 100 families, but about 
10 families were not members because they lived too far from the forest or were sick. 
Four male respondents, all amputees (missing a leg or a foot), did not engage in the CF 
because of their disabilities. One of them explained this was because of a requirement 
to join activities like patrolling. Others said they got no information about enrolment, 
including an elderly woman who claimed she was not informed because she was old 
and incapable of contributing to any CF activities. Several respondents said they did 
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not participate in activities because they were too busy working or due to a lack of 
financial support for petrol to travel to the forest. 
All four constraints can, to different degrees or acting in synergy, limit the ability 
of a person to join the CF and/or participate actively, in particular in patrolling ac-
tivities, during which many forest products (e.g. mushroom, fish, fuel wood) can be 
extracted. In turn, such constraints can exclude a person or household from enjoying 
the forest benefits because of their lack of contribution to the CF. The background for 
applying distributive principles based on contribution can be found in the CF regula-
tions. While the Sub-decree on CF management states that Cambodian citizens liv-
ing within the participating communities can be members, it also lists the roles and 
duties of community forestry members, including participation in forest resources 
management, in monitoring the use of community forest resources, and in conserv-
ing, protecting, and planting the forest (RGC, 2003). All these duties require a certain 
level of good health and available resources not likely to be present in all strata of 
a community. Whether these legal requirements are even feasible and how and to 
what extent they are followed across the CFs is likely to vary.
According to the Sub-decree, the specific benefit sharing principles are part of the 
CF regulations passed by the individual CF Management Committees (RGC, 2003, Article 
5.8) who engage in decision-making and contribute to forest protection. Empirical find-
ings from five CFs show that in many instances, only the better-off households can 
afford to engage and participate actively in the management of the CF, consequently 
dominating decision-making bodies and enjoying the benefits of forest protection. The 
case study also indicates that the requirements of active participation are explicitly in-
terpreted at the local level when it comes to extracting forest benefits. This is true both 
for non-members or non-active members, who willingly or less willingly disengage with 
the CF, and for the CF committee and other active members, who expect to get a larger 
share of the forest resources, including expected benefits from carbon funding. As told 
by a former CF patroller (personal communication, Samaky CF, July 6, 2011): 
Subcommittee told me I could collect timber during patrols, but [I] never got the benefits from the sale, 
which were shared among other patrollers and [CF] committee. 
From the perspective of the CF committee, the biased distribution of benefits is con-
sidered fair, as reflected in interviews with two CF leaders: 
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[We/I] don’t want to distribute in cash to all members . . . The [carbon] funds will contribute to village develop-
ment, and cash will provide to the members who are active in patrol activities, to fire breaker building and so 
on. For those who are not active, they will not get any cash. (personal communication, Samaky CF, July 2, 2011) 
 
The committees and members who are active will get benefits from the [carbon] project, such as the 
patrol team for example. (personal communication, Prey Srorng CF, July 13, 2011)
Moreover, the empirical findings indicated a risk of inequitable distribution of ben-
efits when some CF members were deliberately kept out of the information flow and 
thereby not able to participate. This in turn ensures a larger share of the benefits for 
the other members. It can happen when the CF leader calls in (or refrains from call-
ing) individual members to participate in patrols or delegates this task to selected 
patrol team leaders. A few respondents directly accused high level CF members, who 
control the information flows and delegates tasks, of (de-)selecting certain members 
when benefits were ready to be extracted. Several indications of such deliberate 
exclusion and unequal benefit sharing were found, for instance as put forward in an 
interview with a former CF patroller:
[I] used to be active [in CF], but stopped being called to patrols and other activities five months ago . . . 
Other CF members share the benefits among them. [I] didn’t get any benefits – other members do – [there 
is] favoritism of a closed group of related patrollers who keep the information and benefits to themselves. 
(personal communication, Samaky CF, July 5, 2011)
Following up on statements as the ones presented above, a further investigation of the 
CF structures was conducted in order to explore the internal relations among some of 
the active CF members. This study revealed that many members of the management 
committees and forest patrol teams were often relatives, neighbors, or otherwise 
closely acquainted, e.g. with a shared history of settlement, as reflected in Figure 4. 
Finally, some respondents also directly accused their CF committee of illegal activi-
ties depleting the forest for personal gain, as exemplified by a male interviewee:
Some members collect valuable, endangered timber for sale. [There are] no big trees left. Subcommittee 
and leader [are] involved. Now, a few people work with patrolling and do timber business” (personal com-
munication, Samaky CF, July 6, 2011). 
These accusations and their relation to the social structures in the CFs are discussed 
below from an equity perspective together with the other findings from the case study.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Put together, the findings from the case study in Oddar Meanchey indicate the follow-
ing: The poorest households are often more recent migrants with less secure tenure 
and risky settlement locations. As a result, this group is disproportionately affected by 
land-use changes in terms of deforestation and land grabbing. Meanwhile, the sharing 
of the benefits from protecting the remaining patches of forest seem to be biased away 
from the poorest households, facilitated by various constrains and social exclusion. In 
turn, the risk of inequity is two-fold, as both costs and benefits are shared unevenly 
within communities, creating a ‘double inequity’. The case study specifically indicates 
that the poor are more reliant on forest products due to less agricultural land and more 
insecure tenure. In turn, as the poorest respondents are excluded or constrained from 
enjoying the benefits of the remaining forest protected under CF/REDD+, this minimizes 
the role of the forest in providing livelihood alternatives or supplements. This poses 
Figure 4: Diagram of relations in CF. A fraction of relationship mapping of the structure in 
one of the Oddar Meanchey CFs. Full arrow indicates blood relatives. Dashed arrow indicates 
a historical link or a settlement relation (* the CF leader urged other families from her former 
province Ta Keo to settle in Oddar Meanchey).
Source: Data collected by the authors
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a serious concern for reaching the equity objectives and social co-benefits in REDD+ 
(UN-REDD, 2009). Although framed as constraints to participation and deliberate ex-
clusion, these types of social exclusion can also be viewed from a broader “access” 
perspective (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) as “the ability to derive benefit from things” (p. 153). 
In this perspective, access includes a wider range of social relationships that constrain 
or enable benefits from resource use. Shaping how benefits are gained, controlled, 
and maintained, the mechanisms of access also include technology, capital, markets, 
labor, knowledge, authority, and identities. Several of the issues covered in this analysis 
clearly relate to these mechanisms, such as knowledge (e.g. information about CF en-
rolment and patrols), authority (legal or customary rights to manage resources), labor 
(e.g. forest patrol), and social relations and identity (e.g. distribution of and exclusion 
from benefits). In particular, identity and social relations were shown to profoundly af-
fect access and distributional equity, based on CF membership positions and forest pa-
trol groupings facilitated by prevailing power structures. Empirical findings specifically 
raise concerns about the presence of patron-client relations in the CF management 
with their interdependencies and mutual exchange of benefits. The social structures 
seem to pose a risk, not only to the equitable distribution of benefits but also in terms 
of facilitation of illegal forest activities, such as logging of valuable timber, within the 
core clientele. Combined with the exclusion of peripheral members, such activities 
can potentially flourish and be effectively covered-up to the benefit of the patron and 
the selected core clients. The forest offenders could thereby be the same people who 
are supposed to monitor illegal activities, and they could easily blame outsiders or the 
lack of funding for protection activities to cover their own illegal extraction. However, 
such potential illegal activities are frequency-dependent, as too much illegal harvest-
ing will harm project outcomes and in turn reduce carbon funds, while some illegal 
harvesting might go unnoticed. It also depends on whether the long-term perspective 
of forest protection outcompete the short-term gains in the offenders’ view. Arguably, 
even with some slip, the illegal activities are fewer than with no protection at all. The 
management committees and in particular the CF leader, who are selected to represent 
the community, are granted an important domain of power to shape resource access 
and rights on the ground (Larson, Marfo, Cronkleton, & Pulhin, 2010). This is of concern 
in relation to procedural equity and benefit sharing – at least on the daily basis, where 
the elected committee acts at the local level without interference from forestry au-
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thorities and CF/REDD+ implementing agencies, who visit the sites and meet with the 
leaders only when time and resources allow.
The findings presented in this paper question the common development discourse 
arguing that democratic institutions play a largely positive role in catalyzing pro-poor 
policies (see Hickey, 2009). Instead, the formal democracy in CF structure and proce-
dures tend to reinforce social and economic inequities in the community (Young, 2000) 
as benefits are captured and distributed in already present informal institutions. Thus, 
while such community-based programs seem ideal, there is a strong likelihood that the 
newly created structures will come to mirror prevailing patron-client structures that 
dominate the region, and it is unreasonable to assume that forming new committees 
through elections will automatically create a nonbiased and representative body (Led-
gerwood, 1998). The practical outcome of the forest tenure arrangements in CF/REDD+ 
in Oddar Meanchey then falls between a statutory system with legally defined and en-
forced rules and rights, such as CF regulations, and a customary system with rules that 
are socially defined, where some community members participate in decision-making 
while simultaneously taking on exclusion and monitoring responsibilities (Doherty & 
Schroeder, 2009). The case study findings suggest that simply formalizing customary 
tenure will not automatically yield positive outcomes to all members of communities. 
Thus, even when laws are seemingly fair, they can be unevenly implemented or selec-
tively enforced, and are thereby not sufficient to overcome existing inequities (Larson 
& Ribot, 2007). From a more practical perspective, policies promoting participation and 
assisting poor and marginalized groups across rural Cambodia and beyond require the 
engagement of such private power structures at the village level, even at the risk of 
legitimizing and becoming reliant upon these networks for the implementation of proj-
ects (Hughes, 2001). This in turn presents a dilemma and a challenge for policy makers 
and practitioners on how to integrate development goals with culturally embedded 
power relations in the implementation of policies such as REDD+. In the case presented 
here, the biased distribution of both costs and benefits creates a double inequity for 
the most vulnerable groups in the participating local communities; quite contrary to 
the ambitious social objectives of the forest protection programs. From a policy per-
spective, such adverse impacts on local actors could even compromise the overall ef-
fectiveness of REDD+ (Doherty & Schroeder, 2011), which highlights the relevance of 
assessing the local equity dimensions. 
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Tackling the social implications of deforestation and forest protection in order to 
ensure more equity is not an easy task. However, based on the findings and analyses 
in this paper, five recommendations (to researchers, donors, and practitioners) on how 
to address the sharing of benefits from remaining protected forests are presented (see 
also suggestions by Mahanty, Burslem, & Lee, 2007).
Besides strengthening formal institutions as a catalyst of informal institution change 
over time (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), one of the greatest challenges here and now lies 
in how to ensure that forest management committees and leaders are more represen-
tative and accountable to the community. Specific measures suggested to ensure this 
could be: 
1. Granting special consideration to non-members and to members who are not 
active in CF. Project implementers who are responsible for reaching social objec-
tives should strive to ensure that benefit sharing principles are agreed on and 
implemented accordingly, such as a need-based or pro-poor approach outlined 
in the Project Design document (Terra Global, 2012, see the fourth point below); 
2. Using a rotational system for patrol teams and committee members (the five-
year duration could potentially be reduced and re-election prohibited) to in-
crease participation and representation. However, the time limit could poten-
tially enhance illegal activities as offenders would seek to optimize benefits dur-
ing their time of authority. This could potentially be counteracted by: 
3. Involving a so-called external insider in each CF management group as a respect-
ed figure who can mediate conflicts and improve internal unity (Dahal & Ad-
hikari, 2008). Specifically for Cambodia, greater involvement of Buddhist monks 
beyond Sorng Rokavorn CF which is mainly managed by monks (e.g. Brady & 
Rukavorn, 2011) might mitigate risks of exclusion and illegal harvesting. Besides 
these three specific measures, more comprehensive interventions are needed: 
4. Pro-poor initiatives and policies6 should be considered, such as special income-
generating projects and land allocation (Dahal et al., 2010) and pro-poor benefit 
sharing mechanisms to balance the equity in the communities and create incen-
tives towards forest protection. Finally, to alleviate detrimental social impacts 
6   For the Oddar Meanchey REDD+ project, specific social objectives and activities have been outlined based on the 
findings from this and other studies, including improved inclusion and representation of the poorest in management 
committees and CF activities, frequent visits to vulnerable households, and continued research and surveys to 
capture changes in livelihoods (Terra Global, 2012, p. 164).
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from both land grabbing and inequity in CF/REDD+, 
5. Strengthening the conflict management capacity is needed for building trust and 
common understandings, for example, with the establishment of legal recourse 
mechanisms to ensure people’s rights. In order to asses and address these social 
dimensions at the intra-community level, specific mechanisms and minimum 
standards for benefit sharing are needed (Mahanty et al., 2007), supported by 
comprehensive social assessments including more qualitative indicators such 
as indicators reflecting people’s ability to participate in decision making and to 
access resources (Pasgaard, 2013). Importantly, in-depth qualitative research is 
valuable to supplement quantitative household surveys at individual sites.
The scenario described in this paper is probably not unique to Oddar Meanchey. Rather, 
it is likely that other communities in Cambodia and throughout South-East Asia, where 
forest protection is high on the agenda, exhibit similar social imbalances and risk of 
enhanced inequity. The findings indicate an urgent need to better address distributio-
nal equity in community-based forest protection like CF/REDD+. Such programs cannot 
afford to further increase the already skewed social imbalance in many local communi-
ties, as it threatens the global objectives of reducing deforestation whilst encouraging 
environmental and social co-benefits.
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